We analyze the sample complexity of learning graphical games from purely behavioral data. We assume that we can only observe the players' joint actions and not their payoffs. We analyze the sufficient and necessary number of samples for the correct recovery of the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) of the true game. Our analysis focuses on directed graphs with n nodes and at most k parents per node. Sparse graphs correspond to k P Op1q with respect to n, while dense graphs correspond to k P Opnq. By using VC dimension arguments, we show that if the number of samples is greater than Opkn log 2 nq for sparse graphs or Opn 2 log nq for dense graphs, then maximum likelihood estimation correctly recovers the PSNE with high probability. By using information-theoretic arguments, we show that if the number of samples is less than Ωpkn log 2 nq for sparse graphs or Ωpn 2 log nq for dense graphs, then any conceivable method fails to recover the PSNE with arbitrary probability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Non-cooperative game theory has been considered as the appropriate mathematical framework in which to formally study strategic behavior in multi-agent scenarios. The core solution concept of Nash equilibrium (NE) [1] serves a descriptive role of the stable outcome of the overall behavior of self-interested agents (e.g., people, companies, governments, groups or autonomous systems) interacting strategically with each other in distributed settings.
A. Algorithmic Game Theory and Applications
There has been considerable progress on computing classical equilibrium solution concepts such as NE and correlated equilibria [2] in graphical games (see, e.g., [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] and the references therein) as well as on computing the price of anarchy in graphical games (see, e.g., [10] ). Indeed, graphical games played a prominent role in establishing the computational complexity of computing NE in general normal-form games (see, e.g., [11] and the references therein).
In political science for instance, the work of [12] identified the most influential senators in the U.S. congress (i.e., a small set of senators whose collectively behavior forces every other senator to a unique choice of vote). The most influential senators were intriguingly similar to the gang-of-six senators formed during the national debt ceiling negotiation in 2011. Additionally, it was observed in [13] that the influence from Obama to Republicans increased in the last sessions before candidacy, while McCain's influence to Republicans decreased.
B. Learning Graphical Games
The problems in algorithmic game theory described above (i.e., computing Nash equilibria, computing the price of anarchy, or finding the most influential agents) require a known graphical game which is unobserved in the real world. To overcome this issue, learning binary-action graphical games from behavioral data was proposed in [13] , by using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). We also note that [13] , [12] have shown the successful use of graphical games in real-world settings, such as the analysis of the U.S. congressional voting records as well as the U.S. supreme court. More recently, the work of [14] provides a statistically and computationally efficient method for learning binaryaction sparse games.
C. Contributions
In this paper, we study the statistical aspects of the problem of learning graphical games with general discrete actions from strictly behavioral data. As in [14] , [13] , we assume that we can only observe the players' joint actions and not their payoffs. The class of models considered here are polymatrix graphical games [15] , [4] . We study the sufficient and necessary number of samples for the correct recovery of the pure-strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) set of the true game, for directed graphs with n nodes and at most k parents per node. Theorem 3 shows that the sufficient number of samples for MLE is Opkn log 2 nq for sparse graphs, and Opn 2 log nq for dense graphs. Theorem 4 shows that the necessary number of samples for any conceivable method is Ωpkn log 2 nq for sparse graphs, and Ωpn 2 log nq for dense graphs. Thus, MLE is statistically optimal.
D. Discussion
While sparsity-promoting methods were used in prior work [14] , [13] for binary actions, the benefit of sparsity for learning games with general discrete actions has not been theoretically analyzed before. In this paper, we focus on the statistical analysis of exact MLE. 1 Prior work on MLE estimation [13] has not focused on the correct PSNE recovery, but on generalization bounds. More formally, Corollary 15 in [13] shows that for dense graphs with n nodes and binary actions, Opn 3 q samples are sufficient for the empirical MLE minimizer to be close to the best achievable expected loglikelihood. As a byproduct of our PSNE recovery analysis, Lemma 2 shows that for dense graphs and general discrete actions, only Opn 2 log nq samples are sufficient for obtaining a good expected log-likelihood. Regarding PSNE recovery, the results of [14] provide a Opk 4 log nq sample complexity for learning binary-action sparse games. The above results pertain to a specific class of payoff functions with a particular parametric representation, that allows for a logistic regression approach. The results in [14] also assume strict positivity of the payoffs in the PSNE set. Thus, it is unclear how these results can be extended to general discrete actions.
II. GRAPHICAL GAMES
In classical game-theory (see, e.g. [17] for a textbook introduction), a normal-form game is defined by a set of n players V " t1, . . . , nu, and for each player i, a set of actions, or pure-strategies A i , and a payoff function
The payoff functions u i map the joint actions of all the players to a real number. In non-cooperative game theory we assume players are greedy, rational and act independently, by which we mean that each player i always want to maximize their own utility, subject to the actions selected by others, irrespective of how the optimal action chosen help or hurt others.
A core solution concept in non-cooperative game theory is that of an Nash equilibrium. A joint action x P A is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) of a non-cooperative game if, for each player i, x i P arg max aPAi u i pa, x´iq. That is, x constitutes a mutual best-response, no player i has any incentive to unilaterally deviate from the prescribed action x i , given the joint action of the other players x´i P Ś jPV´tiu A j in the equilibrium. For normal-form games, we denote a game by G " tu i : A Ñ Ru iPV , and the set of all pure-strategy Nash equilibria of G by
A (directed) graphical game is a game-theoretic graphical model [4] . It provides a succinct representation of normalform games. In a graphical game, we have a (directed) graph G " pV, Eq in which each node in V corresponds to a player in the game. The interpretation of the edges/arcs E of G is that the payoff function of player i is only a function of his own action and the actions of the set of parents/neighbors N piq " tj | pi, jq P Eu in G (i.e., the set of players corresponding to nodes that point to the node corresponding to player i in the graph). In this context, for each player i, we have a local payoff function u i : A iˆŚ jPN piq A j Ñ R. A joint action x P A is a PSNE if, for each player i, x i P arg max aPAi u i pa, x N piq q. For graphical games, we denote a game by G " tu i : A iˆŚ jPN piq A j Ñ Ru iPV .
In this paper, we focus on polymatrix games [15] . Under this model, the local payoff functions u i : A iˆŚ jPN piq A j Ñ R have a succint representation as a sum of a unary potential function u ii : A i Ñ R and several pairwise potential functions u ij :
For polymatrix graphical games, we denote a game by
We assume that A i is a countable finite set such that |A i | ě 2 for all players i. Further, |A i | P Op1q with respect to n and k.
The binary-action models considered in [14] , [13] , [12] are a restricted subclass of the models that we consider here. The results in [14] , [13] , [12] 
A. Equivalence Classes
Each PSNE set defines an equivalence class of games for which players have the same joint behavior. Thus, as argued further in Section 4 in [13] for binary-action games, it is not possible to recover the structure and payoff functions of the true game from observed joint actions. Instead, we can recover the PSNE set (or equivalence class) of the true game. Here, we study the sufficient and necessary number of samples for the correct recovery of the PSNE set of the true game.
B. Main Assumptions
Our assumptions are minimal: ‚ We do not assume the availability of any information regarding the structure or parameters of the true graphical game. The problem is precisely to infer that information. ‚ We do not assume the availability of data related to the temporal dynamics, i.e., each player's move. Instead, we assume that we only observe steady-state joint actions, i.e., NE. Learning only from NEs, is arguably more challenging than learning from temporal dynamics. ‚ To make learning even more challenging, we assume that data might be not entirely faithful to a graphical game. That is, we assume that a portion of the joint actions in the observed/training data is not an NE. This "corruption" can be modeled via a noise mechanism. ‚ Learning games is an unsupervised task, i.e., we do not know which joint actions in the observed/training data are NE or not. 831 ‚ We assume that payoffs are unavailable in the observed/training data, which is a reasonable assumption in some real-world instances.
III. LEARNING GRAPHICAL GAMES
In this paper, we define H to be the class of polymatrix graphical games with n nodes and at most k parents per node, as follows 2
, .
-.
Next, we introduce an extension of the generative model proposed in [13] originally for binary actions. Let G be a game, and let Q G be a set defined as follows 3
With some probability q P Q G , a joint action x is chosen uniformly at random from N EpGq; otherwise, x is chosen uniformly at random from its complement set A´N EpGq.
Hence, the generative model is a mixture model with mixture parameter q corresponding to the probability that a stable outcome (i.e., a PSNE) of the game is observed, uniform over PSNE. Formally, the probability mass function (PMF) over joint-behaviors x P A parameterized by pG,is
where we can think of q as the "signal" level, and thus 1´q as the "noise" level in the data. Additionally, P G,q denotes the probability distribution defined by the PMF p G,q p¨q.
By using the PMF in eq.(3), we can define a (scaled) negative log-likelihood function over joint-behaviors x P A for a game G and mixture parameter q as follows
Note that since we scale the negative log-likelihood with a factor 1{ log p2|A| 2 q then L G,q pxq P r0, 1s for all G P H, q P Q G and x P A. Maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) allows to infer the game (and mixture parameter) from observed joint actions. More formally, given a dataset S of m joint actions, the empirical MLE minimizer is
Assume that a joint action x is drawn from an arbitrary data distribution D. The expected MLE minimizer is given by
2 N EpGq ‰ H and N EpGq ‰ A ensure that P G,q does not degenerate into a uniform distribution, see e.g., Definition 4 in [13] . 3 q ą |N EpGq|{|A| ensures that p G,q px 1 q ą p G,q px 2 q for x 1 P N EpGq, x 2 R N EpGq, see e.g., Proposition 5 and Definition 7 in [13] .
Note that if the data is generated by a true game G˚P H and mixture parameter q˚P Q G˚, then the expected MLE minimizer is the true game and mixture parameter. That is, if D " P G˚,q˚t hen N EpGq " N EpG˚q and q " q˚.
IV. SUFFICIENT SAMPLES FOR PSNE RECOVERY
In this section, we show that if the number of samples is greater than Opkn log 2 nq for sparse graphs or Opn 2 log nq for dense graphs, then MLE correctly recovers the PSNE with high probability.
A. Number of PSNE Sets
First, we show that the number of PSNE sets induced by polymatrix graphical games is Ope kn log 2 n q for sparse graphs, and Ope n 2 log n q for dense graphs. These results will be useful later in obtaining a generalization bound as well as for analyzing the correct recovery of PSNE.
Lemma 1 (Number of PSNE sets). Let H be the class of polymatrix graphical games with n nodes and at most k parents per node. Let dpHq be the number of PSNE sets that can be produced by games in H, i.e., dpHq " |Y GPH tN EpGqu|. We have that dpHq P Ope kn log 2 n q for k P Op1q, and dpHq P Ope n 2 log n q for k P Opnq.
First, we introduce an equivalent representation of polymatrix graphical games. To each unary potential function u ii : A i Ñ R, we associate a vector θ piq P R |Ai| such that u ii px i q " ř bPAi θ piq b 1rx i " bs. To each pairwise potential function u ij : A iˆAj Ñ R, we associate a matrix Θ pi,jq P R |Ai|ˆ|Aj | such that u ij px i , x j q " ř bPAi,cPAj θ pi,jq bc 1rx i " b, x j " cs. Note that the payoff functions u i are linear with respect to the vectors θ piq and matrices Θ pi,jq for all i, j P V , that is
In the above, we can define the parent/neighbor set N piq " tj | Θ pi,jq ‰ 0u and thus, summation across j P V is equivalent to summation across j P N piq. By eq.(1), we have that a PSNE x fulfills u i px i , x´iq´u i pa, x´iq ě 0 for all i P V and a P A i . For polymatrix graphical games, for all players i and a P A i , a PSNE x fulfills Thus, a PSNE is defined by ř iPV |A i | linear inequalities with respect to the vectors θ piq and matrices Θ pi,jq . 832
For every player i and a P A i , let Dpiq " p1`|A i |qp1`ř jPV´tiu |A j |q and define the vectors y pi,aq P t0, 1u Dpiq and φ pi,aq P R Dpiq as follows y pi,aq " pt1rx i " bsu bPAi , t1rx i " b, x j " csu jPV,bPAi,cPAj , 1, t´1rx j " csu jPV,cPAj q , 
For k " n´1, we have that Dpi, n´1q " Dpiq P Opnq, by the well-known VC dimension of linear classifiers, we have VCpH pi,aď Dpiq`1 P Opnq .
Recall that a PSNE is defined by D " ř iPV |A i | linear inequalities. Define the boolean function g : t0, 1u D Ñ t0, 1u as follows gptz ia u iPV,aPAi q " ś iPV,aPAi z ia . Note that if f pi,aq P H pi,aq for all i and a P A i , then gptf pi,aq py pi,aq qu iPV,aPAi q " 1 ô x P N EpGq. Define the function class gptH pi,aq u iPV,aPAi q " " gptf pi,aq py pi,aq qu iPV,aPAi q | p@i P V, a P A i q f pi,aq P H pi,aq * .
By Lemma 2 in [19] then
VCpgptH pi,aq u iPV,aPAiď 2Dp1`log Dq max iPV,aPAi
VCpH pi,a.
Note that D P Opnq. For k P Op1q, by eq.(5), we have VCpgptH pi,aq u iPV,aPAiP Opkn log 2 nq. For k P Opnq, by eq.(6), we have VCpgptH pi,aq u iPV,aPAiP Opn 2 log nq. Finally, note that our analysis of VCpgpH 1 , . . . , H nprovides a bound with respect to PSNE, while we are interested on PSNE sets. Therefore, dpHq ď max iPV |A i | VCpgpH1,...,Hnqq P Ope VCpgpH1,...,Hnand we prove our claim.
B. Generalization Bound
Next, we show that if the number of samples is greater than Opkn log 2 nq for sparse graphs or Opn 2 log nq for dense graphs, then the empirical MLE minimizer is close to the best achievable expected log-likelihood.
Lemma 2 (Generalization bound). Fix δ, ε P p0, 1q. Let H be the class of polymatrix graphical games with n nodes and at most k parents per node. Assume an arbitrary data distribution D. Assume that S is a dataset of m joint actions (of the n players), each independently drawn from D. If m P Op 1 ε 2 pkn log 2 n`log 1 δfor k P Op1q or m P Op 1 ε 2 pn 2 log n`log 1 δfor k P Opnq, then
Proof. For clarity, let L S pG," 1 m ř xPS L G,q pxq and L D pG," E D rL G,q pxqs. By Lemma 11 in [13] , for any game G and for 0 ă q 2 ă q 1 ă q ă 1, if for any ε ą 0 we have
The above implies that for any game G and for any ε ą 0, we have that
where BQ G is the boundary of the set Q G , i.e., BQ G " t |N EpGq| |A| , 1´1 2|A| u. From the above, the union bound, the Hoeffding's inequality and Lemma 1, we have that
where dpHq is the number of PSNE sets that can be produced by games in H, as defined in Lemma 1. The factor 2 in 2 dpHq in the union bound comes from the fact that the set BQ G has exactly two elements. Let T pn, kq " kn log 2 n if k P Op1q, and T pn, kq " n 2 log n if k P Opnq. By solving for m in the last inequality, since dpHq P Ope T pn,kq q, we get m P Op 1 ε 2 pT pn, kq`log 1 δ qq. We proved so far that with probability at least 1´δ, we have |L S pG, qq´L D pG, qq| ď ε 2 simultaneously for all G P H and q P Q G . Additionally, since p p G, pis the pair with minimum L S pG,from all G P H and q P Q G , we have that
833
with probability at least 1´δ, which proves our claim.
C. Sufficient Samples for PSNE Recovery
Finally, we show that if the number of samples is greater than Opkn log 2 nq for sparse graphs or Opn 2 log nq for dense graphs, then MLE correctly recovers the PSNE with high probability.
Theorem 3 (Sufficient samples for PSNE recovery). Fix δ, ε P p0, 1q. Let H be the class of polymatrix graphical games with n nodes and at most k parents per node. Assume that the data distribution D " P G˚,q˚f or some true game G˚P H and mixture parameter q˚P Q G˚. Assume that S is a dataset of m joint actions (of the n players), each independently drawn from D. If m P Op 1 ε 2 pkn log 2 n`log 1 δfor k P Op1q or m P Op 1 ε 2 pn 2 log n`log 1 δfor k P Opnq, then
provided that |N EpG˚q| ě 2 and ε ă βp|N EpG˚q|, q˚q where 4 βpr,"
Proof. Here, we follow a worst case approach in which we analyze the identifiability of the PSNE set of G˚with respect to a game G´that has one PSNE less than G˚. For our argument, showing the existence of such polymatrix graphical game G´is not necessary. In fact, a more general argument could be made with respect to a game that has k´ě 1 less PSNEs than G˚. The analysis for k´" 1 provides the sufficient conditions for the general case k´ě 1.
For clarity, let cpnq " log p2|A| 2 q, y N E " N Ep p Gq and N E˚" N EpG˚q. Define the game G´by its PSNE set N E´" N EpG´q as follows. Define the set N E´" N E˚´txu for some x P N E˚. It can be easily verified that
For any pair of games G, G 1 P H, let N E " N EpGq and N E 1 " N EpG 1 q. For any pair of games G, G 1 P H, and mixture parameters q P Q G and q 1 P Q G 1 , we have
Note that the pair pG´, q˚q is well defined. More formally, since |N E´| " |N E˚|´1 then we have that Q G´" pp|N E˚|´1q{|A|, 1´1{p2|A|qs. Thus, q˚P Q G˚ñ q˚P Q G´. From eq.(7), we have KLpP G˚,q˚} P G´,q˚q " E P G˚,q˚r log p G˚,q˚p xq´log p G´,q˚p xqs
A|´|N E˚|`1 . By the assumption in the theorem and the above, we have that cpnq ε ă cpnq βpn, |N E˚|, q˚q " KLpP G˚,q˚} P G´,q˚q .
Note that since D " P G˚,q˚t hen N EpGq " N EpG˚q and q " q˚. By Lemma 2 and eq.(4), if m P Op 1 ε 2 pkn log 2 n`log 1 δfor k P Op1q or m P Op 1 ε 2 pn 2 log n`log 1 δfor k P Opnq, then cpnq ε ě cpnq E P G˚,q˚r L p G,p q pxq´L G˚,q˚p xqs " E P G˚,q˚r log p G˚,q˚p xq´log p p G,p q pxqs " KLpP G˚,q˚} P p G,p. Note that from the above and eq.(8), we have that KLpP G˚,q˚} P p G,pă KLpP G˚,q˚} P G´,q˚q . That is, the empirical MLE minimizer p p G, pis better than the pair pG´, q˚q. Therefore, y N E includes all the PSNE in N E˚, i.e., N E˚Ď y N E and we prove our claim.
Remark. A similar argument as in Theorem 3 can be used to show that N Ep p
Gq Ď N EpG˚q, although the sufficient number of samples increases to Opkn 3 log 2 nq for sparse graphs, and Opn 4 log nq for dense graphs. (The function β in such a case does not contain the 1{ log p2|A| 2 q P Op1{nq factor.)
V. NECESSARY SAMPLES FOR PSNE RECOVERY
In this section, we show that if the number of samples is less than Ωpkn log 2 nq for sparse graphs or Ωpn 2 log nq for dense graphs, then any conceivable method fails to recover the PSNE with probability at least 1{2.
Theorem 4 (Necessary samples for PSNE recovery). Let H be the class of polymatrix graphical games with n nodes and at most k parents per node. Assume that the true game 834
G˚is chosen uniformly at random (by nature) from a finite subset of H. Assume that the true mixture parameter qi s known to the learner. After choosing the true game G˚, nature generates a dataset S of m joint actions (of the n players), each independently drawn from P G˚,q˚. Assume that a learner uses the dataset S in order to choose a game p G. If m P Ωpkn log 2 nq for k P Op1q or m P Ωpn 2 log nq for k P Opnq, then
for any conceivable learning mechanism for choosing p G.
Proof. Let A i " t1, . . . , |A i |u for all i P V , w.l.o.g. Let Π " tπ | π Ď V^|π| " ku. Let π P Π be the set of k "influential" players. Assume that nature picks π uniformly at random from the`n k˘e lements in Π. For a fixed π, we will construct a true game G π . For clarity, we define G π " Gå nd q " q˚. The goal of the learner is to use the dataset S in order to choose a set p π of k players, and to output a game G p π " p G. For a fixed π, we construct a game G π with a single PSNE (i.e., |N EpG π q| " 1) as follows. The k "influential" players do not have any parent, i.e., N piq " H for i P π. We force the "influential" players i P π to have a best response 1, by setting their potential functions as follows.
p@i P πq u ii px i q " 1rx i " 1s .
By eq.(2), the local payoff function for i P π becomes u i px i q " 1rx i " 1s. The remaining n´k "influenced" players have the k "influential" players as parents, i.e., N piq " π for i R π. We force the "influenced" players to have a best response 2, by setting their potential functions as follows p@i R πq u ii px i q " 0 , p@i R π, j P πq u ij px i , x j q " 1rx i " 2, x j " 1s .
By eq.(2), the local payoff function for i R π becomes u i px i , x N pi" ř jPπ 1rx i " 2, x j " 1s. The constructed game G π has a single PSNE x π . More specifically p@i P πq x π i " 1 , p@i R πq x π i " 2 , N EpG π q " tx π u .
Since we assume a known fixed mixture parameter q and since |N EpG π q| " 1, the PMF defined in eq.(3) reduces to p π pxq " p G π ,q pxq " 1rx " x π s q`1rx ‰ x π s 1´q |A|´1 . Let P π denote the probability distribution defined by the PMF p π p¨q. Clearly, π ‰ π 1 ô x π ‰ x π 1 . Thus, for all π ‰ π 1 the Kullback-Leibler divergence is bounded as follows KLpP π }P π 1 q " ÿ xPA p π pxq log p π pxq´ÿ xPA p π pxq log p π 1 pxq " p π px π q log p π px π q`ÿ x‰x π p π pxq log p π pxq p π px π q log p π 1 px π q´p π px π 1 q log p π 1 px π 1 q ÿ xRtx π ,x π 1 u p π pxq log p π 1 pxq " q log q`p|A|´1q 1´q |A|´1 log´1´q |A|´1q log´1´q |A|´1¯´1´q |A|´1 log q p|A|´2q 1´q |A|´1 log´1´q |A|´1" |A|q´1 |A|´1´l og q´log´1´q |A|´1¯¯. Assume that the value of the mixture parameter (known to the learner) is q " 2{|A| P Q G π . Thus, for all π ‰ π 1 we have KLpP π }P π 1 q " log p|A|´1q´log p|A|{2´1q |A|´1 P Op1{pn log nq .
Conditioned on π, S is a dataset of m i.i.d. joint actions drawn from P π . That is, S | π " P m π . The mutual information can be bounded by a pairwise KL-based bound [20] as follows
KLpP m π }P m π 1 q ď max π‰π 1 KLpP m π }P m π 1 q " m max π‰π 1 KLpP π }P π 1 q P Opm{pn log nqq .
Note that p π " π ô N EpG p π q " N EpG π q. Let T pn, kq " k log n if k P Op1q, and T pn, kq " n if k " n{2. Next, we show that log |Π| P ΩpT pn, kqq. For k P Op1q, we have |Π| "`n k˘ě p n k q k and thus log |Π| P Ωpk log nq " ΩpT pn, kqq.
For k " n{2, we have |Π| "`n n{2˘ě p n n{2 q n{2 " 2 n{2 and thus log |Π| P Ωpnq " ΩpT pn, kqq. By the Fano's inequality [21] on the Markov chain π Ñ S Ñ p π we have P G˚,S rN Ep p Gq ‰ N EpG˚qs " P π,S rN EpG p π q ‰ N EpG π qs " P π,S rp π ‰ πs ě 1´I pπ, Sq`log 2 log |Π| ě 1´Oˆm {pn log nq T pn, kq" 1{2 .
By solving the last equality, we prove our claim.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
There are several ways of extending this research. Other noise processes can be analyzed, such as a local noise model where the observations are drawn from the PSNE set, and subsequently, each action is independently corrupted by noise. Other equilibria concepts can also be studied, such as mixed-strategy Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria and epsilon Nash equilibria. 835
